court of appeals then denied Kaufman's application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis.' 0 The Supreme Court granted certiorari," and treated these actions by the lower courts as denying that claims of unlawful search and seizure could be raised on a motion to vacate under Section 2255.2 This denial was in accord with overwhelming precedent throughout the federal judicial system.' 3 authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate. A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.
The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner. 8 Kaufman v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Mo. 1967 ).
9 Id. at 487.
10
In foria pauperis is the manner in which an indigent defendant perfects an appeal without liability for costs. The denials to Kaufman were not accompanied by written opinions. U390 U. S. 1002 (1968 In several cases, however, the courts have indicated a substantial degree of uncertainty as to the propriety of this rule by denying the motion on the merits and suggesting dismissal of the claim as noncognizable under Section 2255 or on alternate grounds.
14 This uncertainty is, perhaps, understandable since the federal courts regularly entertain the motion when it is based on other constitutional grounds. Cir. 1965 ) (fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination). Section 2255, the mechanism by which a federal prisoner may apply for collateral relief, is simply one species of the genus labeled habeas corpus. However, the term habeas corpus is more commonly affiliated with the state prisoner's request for collateral relief in a federal court which is governed by 28 U.S.C. 2254. Because the substantive extent of Section 2255 is defined by the scope of rights cognizable under a writ of habeas corpus to state prisoners, effect is given to 2255 claims having 2254 precedents. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 n.5 (1962) 494, 496 (10th Cir. 1963) , said that the issue of the admissibility of illegally seized evidence had a constitutional basis and was therefore available under section 2255. The rationale for this conclusion was gleaned from Justice Black's concurring opinion in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 662 (1961) :
[Wihen the Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable searches and seizures is considered together with the Fifth Amendment's ban against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges which not only justifies but actually requires the exclusionary rule. In United States v. Sutton, 321 F.2d 221, 222-23 (4th Cir. 1963) , the Fourth Circuit indicated that the improper seizure of evidence in violation of the fourth amendment was a constitutional question which could be raised in an application for vacation or correction of a single sentence. The Court was concerned with the magnitude of the error committed and based its conclusion on Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962) (1952) .
18 Among the serious practical difficulties that had arisen in administering habeas corpus procedure to federal prisoners was the requirement that the action be brought in the court of the district of confinement. The few district courts whose territorial jurisdiction included the major federal penal institutions were required to handle an inordinate number of habeas corpus actions. During the six years preceeding enactment of section 2255 in 1948, 63% of all habeas corpus applications were filed in but 5 of the 84 district courts. See Speck, Statistics on Federal Habeas Corpus, 10 OmO ST. L.J. 337 (1949) . The district courts encountered numerous other hurdles in attempting to decide collateral claims away from the scene of the factual situation, the homes of witnesses, and the records of the sentencing court. Because the trial records were not always available, the court in the district of confinement was often forced to consider repetitious or frivolous applications for collateral relief. Thus, in order to obviate the impediments inherent in habeas corpus procedure regarding federal prisoners, section 2255 was inserted into the 1948 Revision of the Judicial Code. See S. REP. No. 1559 , 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10 (1948 ). 19United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952 Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962) . 20 Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962) . A section 2255 request on the ground that the defendant was not given the opportunity to make a post conviction statement was disallowed because of the insignificance of the error. The Court further stated that an error which serves as an adequate ground for habeas corpus relief is a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice or an omission inconsistent with the basic demands of fair procedure. n which prevented certain constitutional claims from cognizance under 2255 because the writ of habeas corpus was designed for collateral review on a judgment of conviction and not as a substitute for appeal for alleged errors committed at-trial.I
In Kaufman, Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority of a divided court,"° rejected the argument that 2255 relief was not -vailable as a substitute for an appeal by distinguishing the limitations posed in Sunac on the ground that they were discussed in the context of an alleged nonconstitutional trial error, and not error of the magnitude cognizable under a writ of habeas corpus." Brennan then noted that Townsend v. Sai, 2 had 2Id.
at 828-29. 24 The vigor of fourth amendment protection would not be strengthened by the relatively minimal additional deterence afforded by collateral remedy. For the refutation of this argument see note 72 infra and accompanying text. held that habeas corpus was not to be denied state prisoners alleging constitutional deprivations solely * because they failed to seek remedy by appeal" By stating that the power of inquiry on federal habeas corpus is plenary," the Townsend Court apparently cloaked the federal judiciary with jurisdictional authority to consider issues of constitutional magnitude on collateral appeal.
35 However, because Townsend involved the habeas corpus request of a state prisoner, Brennan found it necessary to review the historical development of the habeas corpus remedy in regard to state prisoners as a basis for extending collateral relief to federal prisoners. 2 ' The renowned trilogy of cases that liberalized the post conviction doctrine of habeas corpus to implement justice more expeditiously"7 with regard to state prisoners included Townsend, Fay v. Noia, s and Henry v. Mississippi." In Townsend the Court attempted to redefine and outline the guidelines as to when a petitioner convicted in a state court is entitled to an evidentiary hearing in a federal district court. The petitioner is entitled to review if:
1. The merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing, or 2. The state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole, or 3. The fact-finding procedure employed by the state was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing, or 4. There is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence, or 5. The material facts were not adequately developed in the state court hearing, or 6. For any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the applicant a full and fair fact hearing."
Noia allowed federal collateral review of an unId. at 311-12.
34 Id. at 312. 3" See Brennan, Judicial Supervision of Criminal Law Administration, 9 CRnm AxD DELwQ. 222, 231 (1963) .
36 Although the scope of relief under 2255 is defined by the rights granted to a state prisoner under habeas corpus proceedings, see note 15 supra, the courts continually choose to distinguish the two avenues for collateral relief. This is, perhaps, due to the fact that the federal prisoner applying for post conviction relief has had access to the federal courts while the state prisoner has not. See notes 46-48 infra and accompanying text. ' a court, under the Noia doctrine, could grant relief in the interest of justice even though a prisoner knowingly failed to appeal.
4' Henry expanded this notion by holding that even a legitimate state interest being served by a procedural requirement neither substantiates the constitutionality of state procedure which threatens to override a federal right nor bars a challenge to the requirement on collateral attack.M Thus, collateral relief, as presently interpreted regarding state prisoners, permits a legitimate, viable constitutional claim which is not raised at trial or on appeal to be vindicated through the habeas corpus remedy.
45
The government, in Kaufman, conceded the existence of substantial justifications for federal district court relitigation of federal contentions arising in a state criminal prosecution.
46 Its argument, however, emphasized that, unlike the state prisoner, the federal prisoner was tried in a federal forum from the beginning. Since he had the opportunity to litigate his constitutional claim before a federal judge and to appeal to a federal court of appeals, the federal judicial system has already had 41 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426 (1963) . 42 See note 26 supra. 43 Gladden v. Gidley, 337 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1964) . 4"Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965) . 45 T right to the habeas remedy is usually made conditional on the fact that the constitutional violation was not admitted due to the inexcusable neglect of the defendant in failing to object to an obvious constitutional infirmity. However, inexcusable neglect is reduced to virtual insignificance because a sixth amendment ineffective assistance of counsel issue may be proffered when an obvious constitutional violation goes unnoticed by counsel. Also, where knowledge of constitutional infirmities is clouded by abstruse state procedures, the defendant cannot be charged with inexcusable neglect. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443 (1965) .
46 justifications for affording a federal forum to a state prisoner include the necessity that federal courts have the "last say" with respect to questions of federal law, the inadequacy of state procedures to raise and preserve federal claims, and the concern that state judges may be unsympathetic to federally created the "last say" and no reason exists to allow collateral relitigation.
0 Thus, the government contended that Kaufman should not be entitled to post conviction relief because considerations of finality militate against the continued existence of federal collateral remedy. 4 Justice Brennan negated this argument by asserting that the effective protection of constitutional rights in criminal trials necessitates a continuing access to a mechanism for collateral relief.4 9 "The right then is not merely to a federal forum but to a full and fair consideration of constitutional claims. To supplement his conclusion Brennan placed particular reliance on Sanders v. United States" where the Court reversed the denial of a second 2255 application after the first had been denied without a hearing.
5 5 Spehking for the Sanders majority, Brennan concluded that controlling weight may not be given to a denial of a prior application if it was not adjudicated on the merits or if a different issue was presented by the new application.
5 If a 2255 motion is granted where a new ground is presented through a repeat application, relief should certainly be granted on a constitutional ground initially presented subsequent to trial and appeal. In order to guarantee the full measure of constitutional protection to a federal defendant collateral relief should be available whenever a constitutional claim may arise.
The final contention promulgated by the government proposed that Kaufman's claim that evidence admitted at his trial was the fruit of an illegal search was not a proper ground for collateral attack because of the remote relationship between collateral proceedings and the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule. Brennan did not explicitly refute this contention, but rather stated that it had been rejected with regard to state prisoners7 and, because federal prisoners were now being given 387 U. S. 294 (1967) . Although these cases do not discuss the cognizability of search and seizure claims in a habeas corpus proceeding, the substantive effect of the decisions is to grant habeas relief on fourth amendment grounds. 0394 U.S. at 228-31 (1969 15-17 (1963) . 57 The availability of collateral remedy works to insure the integrity of criminal proc.eedings at and before trial where constitutional" rights are at stake. See generally cases cited note 52 supra. equal consideration," the claim should be rejected regarding federal prisoners as well.
The Court concluded that:
Conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.
59
Justice Black's dissent 0 admitted that collateral attack is justifiable where the constitutional integrity of the fact finding process had been violated, but demanded that the convicted defendant raise the type of constitutional claim that casts some degree of doubt on his guilt." Black noted that the historic role of the doctrine of habeas corpus was to insure against flaws in the guilt determining process.
62
On the factual circumstances applicable to the Kaufman litigation, Black's analysis traverses the issue. Harold Kaufman's original plea was not guilty by reason of insanity;O the illegally seized evidence related to the determination of his mental condition." Whether or not the accused actually committed the crime lapses into the realm of the irrelevant upon a plea of insanity. The focus. of analysis should not center on the prisoner's guilt, but on whether the admission of illegally seized evidence prevented the defendant from establishing mental incompetence. Thus, because the question of guilt is devoid of practical significance when the defendant pleads insanity, Justice Black's dissent is relevant only to the extent that it relates " See note 53 supra and accompaiiying text. 59 [Vol. 61 to the majority's decision in terms of the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule.
5 If, contrary to Black, collateral proceedings have any realistic deterrent effect on unconstitutional police activity, Kaufman should be given the opportunity of establishing his insanity without having to meet the challenge of illegally seized evidence.
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is to compel respect for the Fourth Amendment guaranty of freedom against unlawful search by removing the incentive to violate constitutional rights. 6 Regarding the degree to which the exclusionary rule should be applied, the Kaufman issue may be presented as the confrontation between the deterrent effect that the expansion of collateral proceedings may have regarding official illegality in the form of Fourth Amendment violation and the public interest in convicting a defendant who, by his own admission, is guilty.Y Justice Black agreed with the decision in Thornton v. United States' which indicated that collateral attack would be of little weight in achieving the pattern of lawful conduct by enforcement officials that is the object of the exclusionary rule. 69 The Thornton
Court felt that the fountainhead of maximum constitutional protection regarding illegal search and seizure had been crystallized in Section 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 0 and that the need for enlarging collateral review in order to assure effective vindication of the constitutional interests involved was minimalU'
This conclusion is antithetical to the doctrinal belief that the process of American criminal litigation must secure the constitutional integrity of the proceedings from arrest through incarceration. A semantic argument assuming that the enlargement of collateral remedies will not affect adherence to Fourth Amendment principles is based on a 6" Kaufman v. Although Harlan's position is harsh, the policy underpinnings of his position coincide with the aforementioned considerations of finality 6 The administrative difficulties created by allowing post conviction, post appeal collateral attack on a previously uncontested constitutional point" can 7 The public interest in repressing crime was long ago found to be subservient to the social need that the law "shall not be flouted by the insolence of the office." The quoted language is that of Justice Cardozo, then Judge Cardozo, in People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 23, 150 N.E. 585, 589 (1926) . The paramount social need demanding that every citizen have the type of protection designed to secure the common interest against the unlawful invasion of his property was the basis for the adoption of the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914) . Whether the exclusionary rule is regarded as a judicial sanction or as a constitutional requirement, its magnitude is imbedded at the heart of American constitutional criminal law. Compare United States v. Wallace and Tieman Co., 336 U.S. 793, 796 (1949) 76 See note 48 supra. 7While the problems of stale evidence and other aspects of finality are not peculiar to fourth amendment grounds fpr collateral relief, the analysis here will be couched in "search and seizure" language simply because the Kaufman litigation revolves around that issue. Where fourth amendment grounds may differ best be analyzed by striking an analogy between fresh fruit and wax fruit.
The principle of declaring evidence inadmissible because it was procured as a result of an illegal search and seizure has been referred to as the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrineY s Where the fruit of the poisonous tree is contested in compliance with Section 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 9 the problem of stale evidence is minimal because the fruit is still fresh-the litigation is proceeding, memories are vivid, and witnesses are available. However, if the claim of illegal search and seizure were entertained on collateral attack, not only might the entire trial be discarded, but, taking into account the possible unavailability of witnesses present at the original trial and lapses of memory, the fruit will have spoiled and stale evidence would become a distinct problem 80 Whereas fresh fruit will spoil, wax fruit will not., Thus, if the fruit of an illegal search was considered to possess the longevity of wax fruit, the anti-collateral remedy analysis leads to the belief that the public interest in securing a Just conviction would be prejudiced by the attenuated degree of finality in criminal litigation. The comparison betvieen fresh fruit and wax fruit is demonstrative of the fact that it is not the physical evidence itself, but the manner in which it is obtained that should be the concern of the judiciary. Whether fruit is manifested as fresh fruit or wax fruit, it is still cognizable as fruit; whether. constitutionally violative evidence is contested prior to trial or subsequent to conviction, it is still unconstitutionally seized evidence which, despite notions of finality, should not be admitted against a defendant.
2
Since 2255 relief is now available to vindicate Fourth Amendment violations, it is conceivable that tactical delays in presenting search and seizure claims could permit guilt to go unpunished. An attorney could refrain from objecting to the from collateral claims based on other amendments is in the repercussions of their refusal. If a collateral claim is defeated on the basis of another amendment, only one person will be affected-the person who remains in jail because of the disallowance of his claim; if a Fourth Amendment request for collateral relief is rejected, society as a whole suffers because of the diminished efficacy of the exclusionary rule. 78 admission of illegally seized evidence, avoid the issue on appeal, and request collateral relief under 2255 after a sufficient length of time had passed. Even assuming that Kaufman can be read so as to make irrelevant a deliberate bypassing of an objection at trial, the drawback to this is that a possibly successful suppression of evidence would be foregone and the convicted defendant would remain incarcerated until strategy dictated the tender of a 2255 claim. In any event, it is necessary to establish guidelines under which a 2255 request which, has satisfied the criteria requisite to collateral relief can be rejected. Sanders v. United Statesn enumerated basic standards governing situations in which a repeat application for 2255 relief can be denied. Collateral relief should be denied (1) where the ground for relief has been determined adversely to the applicant on a prior application and he cannot show that the ends of justice would be served by a redetermination, or (2) where the government can show that the applicant has abused the remedy u These rules should likewise be applicable to federal prisoners requesting collateral relief on a previously uncontested constitutional issue." While the force of these rules would return the issue to the hands of the trial judge, 8 the applicant for collateral relief would not be summarily dismissed simply because the nature of request was based on an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment. While a knowing waiver of constitutional rightsn and inexcusable neglect to proffer an objection to the admission of illegally seized evidencen would constitute abuses of the remedy, other standards of aluse would have to be developed on a pragmatic, case by case basis through the discretion of the trial judge. The burden to show that the ends of justice would be served by a redetermination of his conviction should be on the applicant, but he must be given the opportunity to meet this burden. Before the aura of finality encompasses his convic--373 U.S. 1 (1963) . 86 One member of the federal judiciary feels that a greater reliance on the discretion of the trial judge would alleviate many of the problems in habeas corpus proceedings. See Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus,.8 F.R.D. 171 (1949) .
87 Knowing waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) .
83 See note 45 supra.
